(the writings of)

An Early Wittgenstein Critique of Epistemic Spatiality

In the Tractatus Logico-Philisophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein attempts to show that philosophical problems arise through a misunderstanding of the logic of our language. He also states that it is amatter of indifference as to whether his views have been anticipated by any other philosopher.However, given the modern implications of the work found in the Tractatius it would beirresponsible to not hold the expressed views of the Tractatus against work that would later bedefined by the bounds of which Wittgenstein proposed. In the Tractatus, the propositions ofWittgenstein appear, at least on the surface, capable of describing an indescribably large butpotentially bounded space dedicated entirely to propositions. In proposition 1 he states “Theworld is all that is the case” and also states in 1.21 “Each item can be the case or not the casewhile everything else remains the same. What Wittgenstein describes here is a tautologicalnecessity for propositions that are true about the world, which we take to mean the world inwhich Wittgenstein inhabited which we take to mean that world which is identical with our own.in 2.013 Wittgenstein states “Each thing, as it were, in a space of possible affairs. This space Ican imagine empty, but I cannot imagine the thing without the space” As for these things, “If Iknow an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs (Every one of thesepossibilities must be part of the nature of the object) A new possibility cannot be discovered later(2.0123).” So it seems permissible, according to Wittgenstein, that a propositional space existswhich can either be empty or reflective of possible states of affairs in relation to an object whichoccupies this space. As for how the proposition occupies this space, Wittgenstein states “Wepicture facts to ourselves (2.1).” In a larger context, Wittgenstein has spent the prior propositionsdefining the properties of such objects which can occupy this space and of which he makes a fewnoteworthy observations such as “a spatial object must be situated in infinite space. (A spatialpoint is an argument place.) A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have

some color: it is so to speak, surrounded by colour-space. Notes must have some pitch, objects ofthe sense of touch some degree of hardness, and so on ( 2.0131)” “objects contain the possibilityof all situations (2.014)” and “in a manner of speaking objects are colourless (2.0232).” Thesepropositions represent a set which aim to represent a state of affairs in infinite space at a fixedpoint such that it is when the viewer observes it in the world. While Wittgenstein structured theTractatus in a direct tone with little room for argumentation of the ideas contained within andrejected interpretation save for his own, modern attempts have been made to representpropositions in the space that Wittgenstein describes. In the book Simplicity (1975), Elliott Soberaims to demonstrate that the simplicity of a hypothesis can be measured by ascertaining theinformational value it possesses when related to a question type. While this seems toextrinsically balk in the face of any early Wittgensteinian approach to logical analysis, it can beseen that the hypothesis propositions related to objects described in questions occupy the sameinfinite space described by Wittgenstein. Sober cites a set of propositions from NelsonGoodman’s Fact Fiction and Forecast (Fourth Edition, 1983) to highlight a prediction of objectcolour-space at a fixed point. “Suppose all emeralds examined before a certain time are green.”“At time t our observations support the hypothesis that all emeralds are green and this is inaccordance with our definition of confirmation. Our evidence statements assert that emerald a isgreen, that emerald b is green, and so on... Now let me introduce another predicate... grue... andit applies to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in casethey are blue. Then at time t we have, for each evidence statement asserting that a given emeraldis green, a parallel evidence statement asserting that a given emerald us grue. (73-74).” Sobertranlslates these statements into quantifer logic to demonstrate their effectiveness of answeringthe question “What color is emerald a at time t” by showing different formulations of the

James C Klagge Grue and Bleen do not seem to be atomic (fully analyzed) predicates/properties. But I guess what it shows is that there is no "right" way to tell what is an atomic property.

hypothesis. 39a: (x)(Emerald x -> Green x); 40a: (x){Emerald x ->[(Green x & T(x) < t ) v(Blue x & T (x) > t)]} ; and defining grue as grue iff (Green x & T(x) < t ) v (Blue x & T (x) >t)] 39b: x){Emerald x - [(Grue x & T(x) < t ) v (Bleen x & T (x) > t)]}; 40b: (x)(Emerald x ->Grue x). The minimum extra information of each question demonstrates that 40b is simpler than39b relative to the set (Grue a, Bleen a...) so relative to colors 39 is simpler than 40 and relativeto grulers 40 is simpler than 39. (pg 21) The early Wittgenstein would likely say that suchattempts to represent objects is nonexistent and thus nonsense and it is only relative to thequestion “what color is emerald a at time t?” that the resulting proposition is elicited “Emerald ais green in the year 2000” and yet contained within the Tractatus are early formations of such anargument if the proposition arbitrarily picked by Wittgenstein was not “The object is red(2.0131)” but instead “The emerald is green” for surely the early Wittgenstein would be held tosaying that both propositions take the form of “The x is y” or “x shows y” in relation to the ideathat an object is representing a property regardless of whether it is formed in real or nonrealspace. For Sober in 1975 and likely Wittgenstein in 1922) the year 2000 represented a fixedpoint in the future to which an argument could be represented (see 2.0131). At least thepropositions of Goodman and Sober are contained in the infinite argument space in the way thata witnessed emerald at a fixed point in real space displays a property. As for Wittgenstienspropositions, they may exist only within the Tractatus in the solipsist view “For what thesolipsist means is quite correct ; only it cannot be said; but makes itself manifest (5.62).” Thisview in connection with the propositions relating to objects and object space do not seem inconflict with the views expressed by Goodman and Sober though when taken into account howWittgenstein viewed critical interpretations of his work, he might not be easily persuaded. It isimperative to recognize the context in which Wittgenstein came to these views in order to

understand how he might account for the simplicity principle in relation to propositions.Wittgenstein would have likely agreed with Betrand Russell’s Axiom of internal relations fromThe Monistic Theory of truth in which he states “the fact that two objects have a certain relationimplies... something in the “natures” of the two objects, in virtue of which they have the relationin question (from Tractatus in Context pg. 51 footnote 27, Klagge).” If the nature of twoemeralds is such that they exist in the year 2000 and are both green, a problem this would posefor Wittgenstein is that he is not alive to experience it and thus it exists outside of his world “Thelimits of my language are the limits of my world (5.6).” Further, he states “The propositions oflogic say nothing (They are the analytic propositions) (6.11).” and “All propositions are of equalvalue (6.4)” While Sober and Goodman’s propositions are inherently analytic due to the conceptof color being contained not independently of the object it describes, it seems that relative towhen the propositions were posed they feature a synthetic character in the fact that they do notattempt to describe reality as it stands but rather a proposition which exists in the future relativeto an object situated in physical and colour-space. Wittgenstein would also likely say this isnonsense citing proposition 5.1361 “We cannot infer the events of the future from those of thepresent. Belief in the causal nexus is superstition.” So this places Sober and Goodman’spropositions into question yet again. While they pass the object test and the relations test they donot pass the “nonsense” test on their nature of being logical propositions. If Wittgenstein is tohold such a position from the perspective of the Tractatus it seems to be a Herculean effort tobreach what seems not seperate from the foundations found in Descarte’s Meditation. For while“I am thinking” is a proposition that can be elicited, likely even by the early Wittgenstein, it doesnot seem certain even from the solipsistic perspective that “Therefore I exist” should be elicitedas it would require an inferential move founded in logic, of which says nothing about that which

James C KlaggeRussell is NOT endorsing the axiom of internal relations, he is criticizing it. Wittgenstein also does not accept it.

James C KlaggeFor Wittgenstein logical propositions are senseless, but not nonsense.

really is. While the later Wittgenstein would describe Sober and Goodman’s propositions asfitting within a “Language Game” this is not readily apparent from the Tractatus alone. Rather, itseems that the early Wittgenstein stands in a contrasting relation to the later Wittgenstein andother philosophers. Necessarily the contrast in relation to others itself is permitted by thepropositions that are placed in the form of a book and so at least one relation is established.Therefore for the early Wittgenstein, there is not some other philosopher who does not stand incontrast to Wittgenstein. This problem is solved by faculty of reason at a later fixed point, say,1945. When Wittgenstein began his later philosophic works. That which changed was the worldand Wittgenstein’s perception of it rather than the foundations of logic. So for a fixed point (thetime of the Tractatus’s publication) and a later fixed point (the time at just before the death ofWittgenstein) the arguments of Sober and Goodman are at the first point necessarilyincompatible with Wittgenstein and at the second point permissibly not compatible withWittgenstein (though this can be explained in part by the death of Wittgenstein some 20 yearsprior if one were to take a hardline position on life and understood meaning), so this permissibleincompatibility is remedied by that which we know of the life and works of Wittgensteinhimself. Thus one is permitted but not required to infer what an arbitrarily picked Wittgensteinwould suppose in relation to modern developments in the field of which he studied. This doesnot however, remedy the issue that one can imagine an emerald in the year 2000 and the colour-space it occupies without respect to whether one is alive in 1922, 1975, 1983, 2000, or 2025.Such is the nature of the first proposition postulated by Wittgenstein “The world is all that is thecase” A different avenue might be approached in the realm created by proposition 2.19 “Logicalpictures can depict the world”. If one were to consider Sober and Goodman’s propositions in thiscontext, then they are permitted to be imagined such that they represent the world at a fixed

point, say, the year 2000, despite not existing in the world in which Sober, Goodman, or anyversion of Wittgenstein could logically experience at the time of publication. The tautologicalpermissibility of all emeralds being green in the year 2000 is thus favored over the logicalnecessity of the state of affairs described by Sober and Goodman. While the early Wittgensteinwould be hardly convinced that which is neither permissible nor necessary can exist it seems thatfrom that statements alone there is one case in which neither contingency is favored over theother (the case in which both contingencies are declared false). Consider a classroom setting inwhich instead of Wittgenstein lecturing with his back to the students, the students turn their backto the early Wittgenstein. Thus the early Wittgensteinian approach can be declared inconsistentwith those who accept a different alternative. This final approach aims to use a solution favoredby Sober in which he forms a Minimum Extra Information set called “Russell’s Razor” in whichone is permitted to accept P in preference to P &∃(x)(Fx). So when presented with “the earlyWittgenstein does not allow for objects represented by nonsense” and “the early Wittgensteindoes not allow for objects represented by nonsense & There is some thing such that it is FactFiction and Forecast which obtains the quality of nonsense” if one knows that Fact Fiction andForecast attempts to represent objects in nonreal space, one is permitted to favor the firstproposition over the second.

Bibliography

Wittgenstein, L, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Translated by D. Pears and B. McGuiness) Published 1921 Translated 1975

Goodman, N. Fact Fiction and Forecast (Fourth edition) Published 1983

Sober, E. Simplicity Published 1975

Klagge, J. Tractatus in Context Published 2021

TL;DR: Those damn emeralds gotta exist somewhere

All In the Family: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Language

The necessary use and manner in which one conveys a proposition are primary concerns
of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951). Wittgenstein was an Austrian philosopher, who, in his
lifetime, traditionally published a single manuscript titled Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
(1921). His other work includes manuscripts given to students to study, copies of his lectures in
written form, and work he set aside to be published posthumously. Wittgenstein famously
rejected both interpretations of his own work as well as interpretations of the work of other
philosophers, with the exception of his posthumously published Philosophical Investigations
(1953) which is a direct attempt of Wittgenstein’s to rectify his then current thinking on the
notion of a proposition in relation to his earlier work, laying the foundation for others to follow a
similar path. This path will be explored from the Tractatus through inspirations for the shift in
thinking relative to the Investigations and the consequences of those ideas for propositional
conveyance explored through modern thought and internet culture.

Two approaches have been explored regarding interpretation of his work: the textualist
sense and the contextualist sense. The textualist sense is concerned only with the writings of
Wittgenstein himself without attempting to position them in the context of his life. The
contextualist sense is concerned with the writings and the life of Wittgenstein in conjunction.
Since much of Wittgenstein’s philosophical work was concerned with actions as much as it was
with propositions, the life of Wittgenstein is an explanatory factor which assists in interpreting
his writings. This will be an important step in explaining the disconnect in thought between
Tractatus and the posthumously published works of Wittgenstein as it relates to the manner in
which a proposition is conveyed and the family resemblances between the words that make up

audio or visual propositions in written or spoken linguistic form. Other works than that of the
Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations with similar ideas of propositional representation will
be compared to the works by Wittgenstein to create a larger understanding of propositional
representation.

In the introduction to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein states the aim of the book is to draw a limit to
thoughts and their expressions through language, for which all other use is “nonsense”. Further,
Wittgenstein argues that the truth value of his propositions is unassailable and definitive as they
relate to communicating propositions. As such, the immediate consequence is that of
descriptively vague and jarring propositions that are unargued for or referenced in any form of
bibliography save for the internal numbering system which has a single footnote attached,
explaining that the numbering system expresses the logical importance of the propositions and a
decimal system which conveys sub thoughts of main ideas.

It is not explained whether specific whole numbers are given importance over others nor
is it explained whether it is in importance of greatest to least. Though, it appears at face value
that proposition 2 descends from proposition 1 and so on until proposition 7. This structure has
been described as having a “two-dimensional tree like structure (Kraft, pg 2, 2016),” with local
and global consequences for the relationship between certain propositions. It has also been
described as potentially being “a private joke on the readers expense (Black, (from Kraft pg 93)
1964).” The numbering system in fact originated with Wittgenstein’s journal kept during the
First World War in which his personal thoughts were kept on one side of the page and his
philosophical work on the other. The Tractatus was assembled from these numbered remarks and
fit together in a final manuscript known as the Proto-Tractatus which was developed into the
published text (Monk, The Duty of Genius, pg 112, 1990).

From these remarks published in the Tractatus we can understand the ground rules and
how they relate to propositional representation. According to Wittgenstein, The World, which is
All That Is The Case, or The Totality of the Circumstances, is described in Facts about Objects
which make up The World (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, ppn 1-2.01, 1921).
These early remarks lay the groundwork for understanding Proposition 2, which concerns what
makes up and governs states of affairs and Proposition 4, which concerns how pictures are
captured in propositional form. The second proposition in the Tractatus postulates that “What is
the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.” Here, among other sub-propositions
Wittgenstein explains that as spatial objects cannot be imagined out of space and those
concerned with temporality out of time, then there is no object that could be excluded from the
possibility of combination with other objects, and as such, independent objects could be
conceived to exist in all possible situations, and yet a word cannot appear in both a singular role
and in a propositional role (Tractatus 2.01-2.0122).

Consider the word “a” in a singular sense it functions as a letter of the alphabet or as an
identifier to an unknown referent and not both at the same time. When used in the fragment “a
rainstorm” we at least understand that there is now a referent, though without a propositional
attitude taken by this fragment, it would be deemed “nonsense” by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus.
If it was further modified to state “there was a rainstorm yesterday” it would now contain the
property of truth or falsity about a conceivable state of affairs. However, two issues arise from
this. The first is that the iterative sense of propositional formation is not addressed “a...a
rainstorm...a rainstorm yesterday...was a rainstorm yesterday...there was a rainstorm yesterday”
and further, that the final proposition is not specific enough to convey a real state of affairs as “If
I am to know an object, though I need not know all its external properties, I must know all its

internal properties (Tractatus 2.01232).” Wittgenstein leaves the extent to which one must
attempt to describe a situation to adequately convey the truth of a specific state of affairs vague.

Consider then, attempting to explain to one’s friend some melodrama that has occurred in
one’s own life. The attempt here is not only to convey the true state of affairs but also to convey
to an adequate degree the distress caused by the other actors in the story. There must exist a
sufficient level of both detail and emotion associated with the conveying the proposition
otherwise one will necessarily fail to convey what they intend through the second-hand
propositional conveyance. This is the chief concern of Wittgenstein’s later work in the
Philosophical Investigations in what he deems Language Games, though an early version of this
postulation is found in the section of the Tractatus related to pictures.

In 4.001 Wittgenstein states “A proposition is a picture of reality A proposition is a
model of reality as we imagine it.” So, in the case of relating a melodrama one conjures a picture
of reality as it stood and attempts to convey this. Since “We picture facts to ourselves” and “That
is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it (Tractatus 2.1 & 2.1511).” The
early Wittgenstein, however, was not entirely concerned with to what degree the friend would be
able to reconstruct the picture of the melodrama but rather that the sequence of events was in fact
real and that the friend was informed. In 6.13 he states, “Logic is not a body of doctrine but a
mirror image of the world.” The intrinsic properties of logic are described rather as at the very
base of propositional representations and are potentially knowable yet exceedingly laborious to
produce. This labor seems to be set aside in the Philosophical Investigations, which aims to
present through a simulated conversation how propositions take form and are conveyed. Though
the Tractatus was a valiant effort to deconstruct language, a paradoxical form is evident in the
preface, where Wittgenstein states, “Here I am conscious of having fallen a long way short of what is possible...

May others come and do it better.”

He also states in the very next passage “I therefore believe myself to have found on all essential points, the final solution of the problems.”
This leaves open the possibility of a continuation of the work, which was conducted privately by
Wittgenstein for the remainder of his life.

Book 1 Chapter 8 of the Confessions which opens Philosophical Investigations details
Augustine remembering his limitation in early childhood where he had reached a limit of mutual
intelligibility with his adult counterparts and thus had to acquire language. Following the
autobiographical section, Augustine transitions to a metaphysical approach to language. In Book
10 Chapter 10 he states, “When I am told that it is possible to ask three kinds of question—
whether a thing is, what a thing is, and of what sort it is—I retain images of the sounds of which
these words are composed.” In this sense Augustine shows how memory shapes interactions

between propositions of the question and answer variety from previous instantiations, a view
rejected by the early Wittgenstein who states in Tractatus proposition 6.31 “This so called law of induction cannot possibly be a law of logic since it is obviously a proposition with sense.--Nor therefore can it be an a priori law.." However compared with other theological approaches to inductive reasoning, the evdence appears to be against Wittgenstein where this is concerned.

Wittgenstein begins the Philosophical Investigations with a passage from St. Augustine
of Hippo’s Confessions regarding how one acquires language in order to name objects and make
requests. Though an early Wittgensteinian approach will not lend much to the propositions of
Augustine, understanding both his view and the views of St. Thomas Aquinas on the subject will
provide additional context into the way in which Language Games are constructed. Though
Wittgenstein himself was not Catholic, he received a Catholic burial and last rites due to an aside
he made to a friend at the death of another (Monk, pg 580, 1990). Given the direct context in
which Wittgenstein references Augustine, the Confessions provides an adequate outline of
Wittgenstein’s views on propositional conveyance through language.
Book 1 Chapter 8 of the Confessions which opens Philosophical Investigations details
Augustine remembering his limitation in early childhood where he had reached a limit of mutual
intelligibility with his adult counterparts and thus had to acquire language. Following the
autobiographical section, Augustine transitions to a metaphysical approach to language. In Book
10 Chapter 10 he states, “When I am told that it is possible to ask three kinds of question—
whether a thing is, what a thing is, and of what sort it is—I retain images of the sounds of which
these words are composed.” In this sense Augustine shows how memory shapes interactions
between propositions of the question and answer variety from previous instantiations, a view
rejected by the early Wittgenstein who states in Tractatus proposition 6.31 “This so called law of
induction cannot possibly be a law of logic since it is obviously a proposition with sense.--Nor

therefore can it be an a priori law.” However, compared with other theological approaches to
inductive reasoning, the evidence appears to be against Wittgenstein where this is concerned.

Though all propositions are given equal status by Wittgenstein in Tractatus Proposition
6.4, it appears our evaluations of them are not. Aquinas states “...all admit that the first cause is
simple, some nevertheless endeavor to introduce in intelligences and in souls a composition of
matter and form (Aquinas, On Being and Essence, Selected Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,
1950).” There seems to be agreement between Aquinas and Wittgenstein that there is such a
conceivable simple first cause from which all others are derived. In terms of objects and their
role however, the early Wittgenstein might suggest that there is a propositional space
representational of the current state of affairs compared to that earlier fixed point in time whereas
Aquinas would suggest a something more akin to a metaphysical Rube Goldberg contraption
moving backwards in time from the present moment.

In order to adequately understand the role induction plays in the later Investigations a
particular problem must be addressed that appears both in language and beyond it. To consider
Language Games, Family Resemblance, Private Language, and Natural Kinds, one must first
recognize an early subdivision of the proposition. David Hume proposed first that All
Propositions Are either Relations of Ideas (Analytic Propositions) or Matters of Fact (Synthetic
Propositions). Of these analytic propositions were self-contained and self-referential such that
the meaning is contained within the words at face value. However, synthetic propositions are
propositions such that their meaning is determined by a corresponding truth reflected by the
proposition of the world itself. According to Hume, Synthetic propositions are expressions in
space and time are a range from proximal to distal. It appears that if one were to hold a
formulation of the law of induction in the form of “the future resembles the past” then one

cannot validly hold knowledge or any lesser form of confirmation of a distal synthetic
proposition. (Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748).

Further, Hume explores an early concept of language games in Of the Understanding. In
the section titled Of The Nature Of The Idea Or Belief he states “It will not be a satisfactory
answer to say, that a person, who does not assent to a proposition you advance; after having
conceived the object in the same manner with you, immediately conceives it in a different
manner and has different ideas of it (Hume, Hume’s Philosophical Works Vol. 1, 1864).” Hume
suggests that one can share a propositional picture in the same way, and it does not necessarily
change the ideas one holds of it if a proposition relating to it is rejected. It seems that instead the
object is just a backdrop for which propositions are used to describe. Consequently, Hume
denounces the idea that one can produce knowledge based on prior experiences uniform with the
new. These ideas seem to position one to conclude that all that exists is the present moment,
however, the Investigations challenges this conclusion through simulated conversations in
everyday language.

After contemplating Augustine, Wittgenstein argues that Augustine was not thinking
appropriately firstly of nouns and secondly of relations. His first sarcastic remark of the
Investigations characterizes Augustine as regarding the remaining kinds of words “as something
that will take care of itself (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 1, 1953).” This tone
taken by Wittgenstein is regarded as having originated from a conversation with Peiro Sraffa “in
which Wittgenstein insisted that a proposition and that which it describes must have the same
‘logical form’ (or ‘grammar,’ depending on the version of the story). To this idea Sraffa made a
Neapolitan gesture of brushing his chin with his fingertips asking: “What is the logical form of
that?” This according to the story, broke hold on Wittgenstein the Tractarian idea that a

proposition must be a ‘picture’ of the reality it describes (Monk, The Duty of Genius, pg. 260-1,
1990).” In this instance though Sraffa did not in fact vocalize the proposition he was advancing,
his advancement of it in visual space conveyed the words associated with the meaning resulting
in Wittgenstein’s understanding.

Wittgenstein’s approach was more refined, with serious consideration of the
consequences of the notion that some gestures could convey a proposition. His first example is
purchasing apples. In this Language Game there are three actors, the purchaser, the buyer, and
the seller. The purchaser gives a list which contains “five apples” and must understand
elementary numbers up to 5 and have a concept of an apple and understand how to complete the
internally nested language game of purchasing from a cashier in order for the request of the
buyer to be fulfilled by the purchaser. In paragraph 42 of the Investigations, he gives a general
recipe for language games with trivially assigned names. “But have names that have never been
used for a tool got a meaning in that game?-- Let’s assume that “X” is such a sign, and that A
gives this sign to B—well, even such signs could be admitted into the language-game, and B
might have to answer them with a shake of the head.” Though informal compared to the rigidity
required of the Tractatus, this propositional representation describes how signs are shaped as
tools through meaning for which they are used to convey propositions. We see the depth-logic
operating beneath the conveying of signs here not completely explored but rather assumed.

Rather than explore the concept of depth-logic, Wittgenstein no longer seems focused on
exploring the intrinsic properties of an object but rather the multitude of surface propositions that
are utilized to describe the subsurface proposition describing completion of a task which he
refers to as Family Resemblance. “...for the various resemblances between members of a
family—build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth—overlap and

criss-cross in the same way. --And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family (Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations, para 67, 1953).” In an earlier set of paragraphs, Wittgenstein
illustrates the differences between family resemblance and nonfamily resemblance by providing
examples of Language Games “Giving
orders...Describing...Constructing...Reporting...Speculating... Forming and testing a
hypothesis...” and operators “Water! Away! Ow! Help! Splendid! No! (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 23 & 27).”

The Language Games notably share the suffix "–ing" referring for one “to act upon” whereas the set of words shown in paragraph 27 do not all
share meaning but all make use of the exclamation sign. If these propositions are to be expressed
and conveyed, then Wittgenstein argues that they must be done so in the wider context of norms
and customs and takes an approach similar to Hume in Of the Understanding. Hume gives seven
pillars for understanding philosophical relation: Resemblance, Identity, Space & Time, Quantity,
Quality, Contrariety, and Cause & Effect. Of Contrariety Hume says “The relation of contrariety
may at first sight be regarded as an exception to the rule, that no relation of any kind can subsist
without some kind of resemblance (Hume, Hume’s Philosophical Works, Vol 1, 1864).” As the
Investigations wind-down so to speak, beyond the work completed in Cambridge in 1945 (Monk
pg. 478, 1990) the coherence of the propositions spreads beyond the classroom environment
characteristic of the prior paragraphs. These paragraphs tackle subjects such as induction and
psychology, a far cry from the atomistic beginnings of the Tractatus.

As Wittgenstein moves away from analyzing family resemblance, his similarities to
Hume are sustained through the problem of induction designated by Natural Kinds. While other
philosophers have attempted to explain this concept through the words and properties that make
up larger propositions, Wittgenstein was concerned more with the naturalness obtained by

spoken propositions. “It is natural for us to say a sentence in such-and-such a context, and
unnatural to say it in isolation. Are we to say that there is a particular feeling accompanying the
utterance of every sentence whose utterance comes naturally to us? (Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, para. 595).” This feeling of naturalness might be expressed as a mode with an
unseen limit of specificity, where separate populations who cannot view each other, all make use
of the same propositional description (on the off chance they require intercommunication).
Consequences of modern thought related to Natural Kinds err on the side of the construction of
frankenpredicates which are given equal status for projecting a future result as one deemed
“natural” as is Sober’s account of Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction found in Simplicty
(1975) and Fact Fiction and Forecast (4th edition, 1983).

This “Grue Problem” takes the basic form of a language game where one supposes to
predict for a set of emeralds with a Hypothesis H relative to the question “Will x be Green?” that
“All Emeralds are Green” however the evidence set also confirms the predicate H’ that “All
Emeralds are Grue” (the property describes emeralds as green before time t and blue after). So,
on the next Emerald one projects that it will be both Green and Grue, which are inconsistent
predictions (Goodman, pg 95,1983). A solution is provided by Sober who “suggests a new
interpretation of the notion of a question and a beginning of a solution to the problem of
question-relativity: A question is a set of predicates designated as natural (Sober, pg 21, 1975).”
By now the problem should be apparent. Sober’s rejection of unnatural predicates seems
unwarranted based only on the nature of the predicate itself relative to a question. Wittgenstein
would appear to argue in return from other statements that it might come to one naturally to say
that an emerald is Grue, but no one would have the slightest idea to what they were referring. “A
philosophical problem has the form: ‘I don’t know my way about’ (Wittgenstein, Philosophical

Investigations, para. 123, 1953).” In a surprising turn of events however 64 years after the
publication of the Investigations dealt with the subject of natural kinds and hidden
frankenpredicates, a projection of understanding of antecedent-consequent relations appeared in
a corner of the internet on a meme-sharing subreddit called r/bonehurtingjuice. It seems given
the interaction between Sraffa and Wittgenstein, that layered visual propositional conveyance
should not be excluded in an internet-based Language Game.

In 2016 a single panel of a DC comic featuring Plastic Man eating from a box of salt and
saying “what” appeared in the comments section of a reddit post discussing the potential
romantic relationships between two characters in an animated show (Fig 1) (Know Your Meme).
The meaning and context of the original use were removed from that of the comic to be enjoyed
by a single reader, but instead co-opted to be used in an exchange of signs between two agents in
an online setting. In 2017 the image was further edited (Fig 2) (Know Your Meme). The box
now reads “powder that makes you say ‘Yes’” and Plastic Man, still eating the powder, now says
“Yes”. Though the early Wittgenstein would have been exposed to posters and advertisements
conveying propositions, since they were outside the bounds of logic they were not properly
addressed. In a Language Games context, the connection between the comic and the viewer takes
a more nuanced form of the Language Game “telling a joke” however the propositional content
of the joke is worth deconstructing in the sense of a Wittgensteinian rejection of Sober’s
Simplicity Criterion for Natural Kinds.

James C Klagge: Wittgenstein has nothing against using simplicity as a standard for assessing a proposal. But he would emphasize that what is simple is relative to a context of consideration. It is not an intrinsic quality of something.

The box contains powder of which a primary property is
established, making the person who consumes the powder say “Yes”. However, the original
propositional conveyance was that of salt and the response “What?” Though it seems the box has
the property of answering the question “How does plastic man respond relative to consuming x”
where x is salt or powder that makes you say “Yes” it instead is understood in a larger language game context. Meme culture contains a certain undefined ruleset in which an expected

proposition is replaced by a separate representation meant to induce humor or recollection from
prior instances. This has evolved to include captions of TikTok videos of people screaming
wildly after eating. A caption reads “Me when I eat the Burger of Horror and Agony” where
these frankenpredicates are seemingly adopted (albiet facetiously) as the preferred prediction by
the viewer in the context of humor rather than any actual prediction relative to the property held
by an object.

Over the course of thought beginning in the Fourth Century AD rules of propositional
conveyance to the self and others have been explored and altered by those who think beyond the
limit of what is possible. While there is some overlap between the various schools of thought that
define the role of language in propositional conveyance, other forms of conveyance have
developed beyond the technology available to those in the time of Wittgenstein and prior. These
texts provide insight into the schism between Wittgenstein in the Tractatus and the
Investigations. This development of conveyance has led to transliteral meaning not anticipated
by those philosophers studied, but from which their views on other forms of conveyance can be
interpreted.

Sources

-(Figure 1)

-(Figure 2)

-“Powder That Makes You Say ‘Yes.’” Know Your Meme, 2017.
https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/powder-that-makes-you-say-yes.

-Aquinas, St. T. & D’Arcy Father M. C. (1950). Selected Wtritings of St. Thomas Aquinas. E. P.
Dutton & Co.

-Augustine, R. S. & Pine-Coffin, (2019). Confessions. Hackett Publishing Company.

-Black, Max (1964). A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Cambridge University Press.

-Goodman, Nelson (1955). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Philosophy 31 (118):268-269

-Hume, D. (1864) Hume’s Philosophical Works, Vol 1. J.W. Bouton

-Hume, D. (1748, republished 2000) Excerpts from An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding. Renaissance.

-Kraft, Tim (2016). How to Read the Tractatus Sequentially. Nordic Wittgenstein Review 5
(2):91-124.

-Monk, Ray (1990). Ludwig Wittgenstein: the duty of genius. New York: Maxwell Macmillan
International.

-Sober, Elliott (1975). Simplicity. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

-Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1921). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (trans. Pears and McGuinness).
New York,: Routledge. Edited by Luciano Bazzocchi & P. M. S. Hacker.

-Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953). Philosophical Investigations. New York, NY, USA: Wiley-
Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe

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-(Figure 2)